Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC Not Attracted in Cross-FIR Homicides: Supreme Court Affirms 302/149 on Strength of Injured Eyewitness Testimony; Delay in FIR and Non‑Recovery of Weapons Not Fatal

Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Supreme Court of India’s decision in Om Pal v. State of U.P. (now State of Uttarakhand), 2025 INSC 1262, decided on 28 October 2025 by a Bench comprising Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sanjay Karol and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra (author). The Court dismissed criminal appeals challenging concurrent findings of guilt under Sections 302/149 and 307/149 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) arising out of a rural boundary dispute that escalated into a double homicide.

The case presented a classic “cross-FIR” fact-pattern: two First Information Reports (FIR No. 65 of 1988 and FIR No. 65A of 1988) were lodged concerning the same incident. One sessions trial (ST No. 56 of 1992) culminated in conviction of the appellants for murder and attempt to murder with unlawful assembly; the cross-trial (ST No. 57 of 1992) resulted in acquittal of the counter-accused. The High Court affirmed both outcomes in a common judgment, prompting the present appeals.

Key issues included: whether the incident was a “free fight” warranting application of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC (and thus a reduction to culpable homicide not amounting to murder), whether the delay in lodging the cross-FIR vitiated the prosecution, the effect of non-recovery of weapons, and—critically—the weight accorded to an injured eyewitness’s testimony corroborated by medical evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, clarifying the doctrinal thresholds that govern such cross-case homicides.

Summary of the Judgment

• The Supreme Court declined to interfere under Article 136 with concurrent findings of the Trial Court and High Court, reiterating the self-imposed restraint that permits intervention only in cases of perversity, misreading, or grave miscarriage of justice.
• On the merits, the Court held that:
  • The appellants were the aggressors. They arrived armed with sharp-edged weapons (spades/phawaras) and delivered fatal head blows to the deceased, Dile Ram and Braham Singh.
  • Injured eyewitness PW-2 (Bangal Singh) was a stamped witness whose testimony, corroborated by medical evidence, was reliable and decisive. Ocular evidence was preferred absent reasons to doubt it.
  • Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC (sudden fight without premeditation and without taking undue advantage) was inapplicable, given the weaponry, targeting of vital parts (head), nature and number of blows, and the background motive from the boundary dispute.
  • The delay in lodging the cross-FIR (explained by the need to rush the injured to a hospital and travel back) was adequately accounted for and therefore not fatal.
  • Non-recovery of weapons did not undermine a prosecution case grounded in unimpeachable ocular testimony and consistent medical evidence.
  • Liability under Section 149 IPC was attracted: the unlawful assembly shared a common object, and individual roles need not be specified to sustain collective liability when the factual matrix supports it.
• Appeals were dismissed; bail bonds cancelled; appellants directed to surrender. The Court clarified that the appellants may seek remission in accordance with law and State policy. One appeal abated owing to the death of the appellant (Inchha Ram).

Factual and Procedural Background

• Incident date: 19 May 1988; rural farmland boundary (“mendh”) dispute between closely related parties descended from a common ancestor.
• Two FIRs:
  • FIR No. 65 of 20 May 1988 (by appellants’ side) under Sections 147, 148, 149, 323, 324, 307 IPC, alleging assault by the complainant side.
  • FIR No. 65A of 23 May 1988 (by complainant’s side) under Sections 147, 148, 149, 307, 323, 324, 506 IPC, alleging that appellants demolished the ridge and attacked with lathis, tabals, axes, phawaras; Dile Ram died on 24 May and Braham Singh on 31 May 1988.
• Trials:
  • ST No. 56 of 1992 (from FIR 65A): all seven accused convicted under Sections 302/149 and 307/149; additional convictions under Sections 147/148 IPC (2 years RI each).
  • ST No. 57 of 1992 (from FIR 65): all accused acquitted.
• High Court (Uttarakhand, 29 Nov 2010): dismissed appeals against conviction and revision against acquittal; affirmed ST No. 56 outcomes.
• Supreme Court: present appeals concerned ST No. 56 convictions; scope focused on whether the High Court erred in upholding the convictions.

Evidence Overview

• Prosecution witnesses included:
  • PW-1 Tejpal Singh (complainant/son of deceased), PW-2 Bangal Singh (injured eyewitness), PW-3 Mahendra Singh and PW-4 Mohan Lal @ Som (eyewitnesses);
  • Doctors: PW-5 (postmortem of Braham Singh), PW-10 (postmortem of Dile Ram), PW-7 (injury reports of victims and accused);
  • Police: PW-6 (registration of cross-cases), PW-8 and PW-9 (investigation).
• Medical evidence:
  • Both deceased sustained severe head injuries, including incised wounds over parietal/temporal regions, consistent with sharp-edged weapons.
  • PW-2 suffered head and limb injuries.
  • Some appellants had injuries (mostly lacerations/contusions; one incised wound on a finger), consistent with a scuffle but not undermining the prosecution’s narrative of aggression by appellants.
• Defense stand (Section 313 CrPC): admitted enmity; claimed false implication and/or that appellants were targeted because of cross-case dynamics; suggested free fight/self-defense.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

• Article 136—Limited interference with concurrent findings:
  • Mekala Sivaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2022) 8 SCC 253: Supreme Court’s self-imposed restraint; interference only for perversity, misreading, or grave miscarriage of justice.
  • Shahaja @ Shahajan Ismail Mohd. Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra, (2023) 12 SCC 558, with references to Balak Ram v. State Of U.P., Arunachalam v. P.S.R. Sadhanantham, Nain Singh v. State of U.P., State of U.P. v. Babul Nath: consolidates principles limiting reappreciation of facts by the Supreme Court.
• Ocular evidence and injured eyewitness primacy:
  • Shahaja @ Shahajan (supra): ocular testimony is the best evidence unless inherently improbable; contradictions of a trivial nature do not render it unreliable.
  • Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab, (2009) 9 SCC 719; Abdul Sayeed v. State of M.P., (2010) 10 SCC 259: injured eyewitness is a “stamped witness”; presence assured; testimony to be relied upon unless major, fatal contradictions exist.
• Motive where there is direct evidence:
  • Sheo Shankar Singh v. State Of Jharkhand, (2011) 3 SCC 654: proof of motive supports but is not indispensable where credible eyewitnesses exist; nonetheless, motive can fortify the conclusion.
• Section 302 vs 304; Exception 4 to Section 300:
  • Pulicherla Nagaraju @ Nagaraja Reddy v. State of A.P., (2006) 11 SCC 444: multi-factor test to discern intention—nature of weapon, vital part targeted, force, number of blows, premeditation, prior enmity, suddenness, undue advantage, etc. Cited to reject downgrading to Section 304 Part I/II when facts evidence intention to cause death.
• Delay in FIR:
  • State of H.P. v. Gian Chand, (2001) 6 SCC 71; Raghbir Singh v. State of Haryana, (2000) 9 SCC 88: delay, if satisfactorily explained (e.g., prioritizing medical treatment), is not fatal.
• Non-recovery of weapon:
  • State Of Rajasthan v. Arjun Singh, (2011) 9 SCC 115; Nankaunoo v. State of U.P., (2016) 3 SCC 317: non-recovery does not derail the prosecution if ocular and medical evidence are cogent; investigative omissions do not exonerate in the face of solid proof.
• Appellants cited cases such as Puran v. State of Rajasthan (1976) 1 SCC 28; Pappu v. State of M.P. (2006) 7 SCC 391; Kailash v. State of M.P. (2006) 11 SCC 420; Vadla Chandraiah v. State of A.P. (2006) 13 SCC 587; Sandhya Jadhav v. State of Maharashtra (2006) 4 SCC 653—generally invoked to argue downgrading to Section 304 and/or to emphasize the “free fight” paradigm. The Court, however, found the factual matrix here—deadly weapons, vital head blows, and aggressor status—rendered those authorities inapplicable.

Legal Reasoning Applied by the Court

• Aggressor determination:
  • Evidence showed the appellants demolished the boundary ridge, initiated the confrontation, arrived armed with spades/phawaras and lathis, and delivered fatal head blows.
  • Complainant’s use of lathis was defensive after the assault began from the appellants’ side. The character and distribution of injuries supported that inference.
• Injured eyewitness as linchpin:
  • PW-2’s testimony placed him at the scene and detailed the sequence: objection to ridge demolition led to abuses, summoning of co-accused, and assault with sharp and blunt weapons.
  • Defense did not effectively impeach PW-2; medical evidence aligned with his account; his presence was undisputed.
• Exception 4 to Section 300 rejected:
  • Applying Pulicherla Nagaraju, the Court emphasized the nature of weapons (sharp-edged), the targeting of vital body parts (skull), number and severity of blows, and the backdrop of enmity from a land boundary dispute.
  • These indicia evidenced intention to cause death (or at least knowledge of its likely result) and the taking of undue advantage, defeating the plea of a sudden, unpremeditated “free fight.”
• Section 149 (unlawful assembly with common object):
  • Although the judgment’s conclusion briefly used the phrase “common intention,” the convictions rest on Section 149 IPC. The facts—collective arrival armed for confrontation, shared motive over the boundary dispute, coordinated infliction of fatal injuries—supported a common object to commit murder/attempt to murder.
  • Under Section 149, individual attribution of the precise fatal blow is not indispensable where the common object is established.
• Delay in FIR adequately explained:
  • PW-1 explained the priority of transporting the injured (including inter-city travel) and returning to lodge the report on 23 May 1988. The Court deemed the explanation natural and sufficient.
• Non-recovery of weapons not fatal:
  • Where ocular and medical evidence are cogent and consistent, investigative lapses like non-recovery do not vitiate the prosecution case.
• Article 136 review:
  • Finding no perversity or misreading by the courts below, the Supreme Court declined to reappreciate evidence and upheld the concurrent findings.

Addressing the Parties’ Contentions

• Appellants:
  • Free fight/self-defense: Rejected. The appellants were aggressors; complainant’s defensive response with lathis did not transform the episode into a mutual free-for-all. Right of private defense is unavailable to aggressors and, in any event, cannot justify fatal head blows with deadly weapons.
  • First FIR and delayed cross-FIR: The mere fact that appellants lodged the first FIR does not establish their version; delay in the cross-FIR was satisfactorily explained by medical exigencies.
  • Witness credibility: The injured eyewitness (PW-2) stood unshaken; PW-3 and PW-4 corroborated the material particulars; minor inconsistencies were immaterial.
  • Downgrading to Section 304 Part II: The targeted, fatal head blows with sharp-edged weapons and the surrounding circumstances demonstrated intention/knowledge sufficient for murder under Section 302; Exception 4 was inapplicable.
• State:
  • Motive: Prior enmity from land/consolidation disputes explained the escalation and supported the prosecution narrative.
  • Injured eyewitness and medical corroboration: The State correctly emphasized the probative force of PW-2’s testimony and the consistency of medical findings with the prosecution’s case.
  • Legal propositions: The State’s reliance on Pulicherla Nagaraju and Abdul Sayeed supplied the doctrinal backbone for rejecting Exception 4 and elevating injured eyewitness testimony.

Impact and Implications

• Cross-FIR homicides in rural land disputes: The judgment provides a clear template for determining the aggressor and assessing claims of “free fight” and Exception 4 to Section 300. Mere reciprocal injuries do not convert a targeted lethal assault into a sudden fight without premeditation.
• Primacy of injured eyewitnesses: Reaffirms that a stamped witness’s testimony, when corroborated by medical evidence, can be sufficient to sustain a conviction even where there are cross-cases or investigative imperfections.
• Section 149 liability: Fortifies the principle that collective criminal liability attaches when common object is inferable from conduct, weaponry, and manner of attack, even if the specific author of the fatal blow is not individually identified.
• Delay and non-recovery doctrine reinforced: Offers practical guidance that realistic post-incident priorities (medical treatment, logistics) can justify FIR delays, and that non-recovery of weapons is not, by itself, destructive of an otherwise robust prosecution.
• Appellate restraint under Article 136: Reiterates that the Supreme Court will not disturb concurrent findings absent perversity—an important signal for litigants contemplating further appeals on fact-intensive grounds.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Ocular evidence: Testimony based on direct human observation. Courts treat credible ocular evidence as the best evidence unless inherently unreliable.
• Injured eyewitness (“stamped witness”): A witness who suffered injuries during the occurrence; his/her presence at the scene is inherently credible, giving their account heightened probative force.
• Unlawful assembly and Section 149 IPC: When five or more persons share a “common object” to commit an offence and act in prosecution of that object, each is vicariously liable for the acts of the others, even without pinpointing individual fatal blows.
• Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC (sudden fight): Reduces murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder when death is caused without premeditation, in a sudden fight upon a sudden quarrel, without the offender having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel/unusual manner. It does not apply where assailants use deadly weapons on vital parts or take undue advantage.
• “Free fight”: A spontaneous, mutual combat where both sides willingly engage. The label does not apply where one side is clearly the aggressor who escalates with deadly force.
• Delay in FIR: Not inherently fatal. Courts look for a sensible explanation (e.g., rushing the injured to hospital). If explained and the core evidence is reliable, delay does not vitiate the case.
• Non-recovery of weapon: An investigative lapse that is not decisive when eyewitness and medical evidence are strong and consistent.
• Concurrent findings and Article 136: When both Trial Court and High Court agree on facts, the Supreme Court interferes only in exceptional circumstances like perversity or misreading of evidence.

Conclusion

Om Pal underscores a pragmatic and principled approach to cross-FIR homicide prosecutions arising from rural land disputes. The Supreme Court’s analysis centers on who initiated and escalated the confrontation, the nature of the weapons, the targeting of vital parts, and the credibility of injured eyewitness testimony aligned with medical evidence. On these metrics, the appellants’ plea of a “free fight” and invocation of Exception 4 to Section 300 failed decisively.

The decision also reaffirms procedural doctrines of wide practical importance: realistic explanations for delay in lodging the FIR will suffice; non-recovery of weapons is not fatal if the core evidentiary matrix is sound; and Section 149’s vicarious liability can anchor convictions without meticulous individual attribution where the common object is established.

In the broader legal context, the ruling consolidates existing jurisprudence rather than forging a novel doctrinal path. Its significance lies in its clear, outcome-determinative application of settled principles: injured eyewitness primacy, the Pulicherla intention test for Section 302 vs 304, and firm appellate restraint under Article 136. For future cases, particularly cross-cases involving agrarian disputes and group assaults, this judgment offers a detailed checklist of factors that will govern the line between murder and culpable homicide, and the evidentiary threshold necessary to sustain convictions under Section 149 IPC.

Key takeaways:

• Exception 4 to Section 300 will not apply where aggressors use deadly weapons on vital parts, take undue advantage, or act in a cruel/unusual manner.
• Injured eyewitness testimony, corroborated by medical evidence, can be decisive even when there are cross-FIRs, delays, or non-recovery of weapons.
• Section 149’s common object liability can sustain convictions without precise individual role attribution in coordinated group assaults.
• Delay in FIR and investigative lapses must be assessed contextually; they are not automatic grounds for acquittal if core evidence is cogent.
• Supreme Court intervention under Article 136 in fact-heavy criminal appeals remains exceptional.