First Doctor-Certified Dying Declaration Can Solely Sustain Conviction; Multiple Declarations to be Assessed Independently — Supreme Court in Jemaben v. State of Gujarat

Introduction

In Jemaben v. State of Gujarat (2025 INSC 1268), the Supreme Court of India reaffirmed critical principles governing dying declarations and the scope of appellate interference with acquittals. The case arose from the death of Leelaben, who suffered 100% burn injuries allegedly inflicted by her aunt-in-law, Jemaben, by pouring kerosene and setting her ablaze during the intervening night of 29/30 November 2004. The prosecution case also recorded minor burn injuries to Leelaben’s four-year-old son who was sleeping next to her. The trial court acquitted both accused (the appellant and a co-accused), finding discrepancies across three dying declarations. The High Court, on State appeal, reversed the acquittal in part and convicted the appellant under Section 302 IPC. The appellant then approached the Supreme Court.

Central issues before the Supreme Court included:

Whether, in the presence of multiple dying declarations with some discrepancies, a conviction can be sustained by relying on the first declaration recorded by a doctor, not by an Executive Magistrate, when supported by corroborative circumstances;
What weight attaches to medical documentation such as the treating doctor’s certificate and hospital intimation (Yadi) narrating the victim’s account;
Whether the High Court was justified in reversing an acquittal where, on proper appreciation of evidence, only one view was reasonably possible.

The judgment, authored by Vipul M. Pancholi, J., and concurred in by Rajesh Bindal, J., firmly upholds the evidentiary sufficiency of the first doctor-certified dying declaration and clarifies the appellate standard in overturning acquittals.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the High Court’s conviction of the appellant under Section 302 IPC. It held:

The first dying declaration made to an independent witness—here, the Incharge Medical Officer (PW-3)—was reliable. The doctor certified the victim’s consciousness and capacity to speak and contemporaneously documented her statement that the appellant poured kerosene and set her ablaze, along with a motive.
Minor discrepancies among multiple dying declarations do not, by themselves, vitiate a case. Each declaration must be evaluated on its own merits. The Court relied on Nallam Veera Stayanandam v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., (2004) 10 SCC 769.
Corroborative circumstances—including the smell of kerosene on the body and clothes, an empty kerosene container recovered from the scene, kerosene-smelling soil, 100% burns on the deceased, and only 10–12% burns on the nearby child—rendered the theory of accident implausible.
Given the record, only one view was reasonably possible: that the appellant committed homicidal burning. The trial court’s acquittal thus warranted reversal by the High Court.

Detailed Analysis

Evidence Appraisal and Factual Matrix

Medical Evidence (PW-3, Incharge Medical Officer):
- Certified that the patient was conscious and able to speak.
- Recorded the victim’s statements: “my aunt-in-law, Jemaben, poured kerosene on me and set me ablaze,” and the motive—pressure to go with one “Mania Dabhawala,” which she refused.
- Issued a medical certificate noting that the whole body and clothing had a kerosene smell and that burns were about 100%.
- Sent a “Yadi” (police intimation) reiterating these facts and requesting arrangements for recording a formal dying declaration.
Forensic/Circumstantial Evidence:
- Panchnama (Exh. 12) recorded recovery of an empty kerosene container with kerosene smell at the scene and kerosene-smelling soil from the hut.
- The four-year-old son sleeping beside the deceased had only 10–12% burns on lower limbs, consistent with a targeted act against the mother rather than an accidental/ambient fire.
- Post-mortem (Exh. 25) confirmed extensive burns.
Witness Testimony and Discrepancies:
- The trial court focused on inconsistencies across three dying declarations and acquitted. The Supreme Court, however, treated the earliest, doctor-certified statement as the most probative, and found corroboration in neutral, physical evidence.

Precedents Cited

The Court expressly relied on Nallam Veera Stayanandam & Ors. v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., (2004) 10 SCC 769, for two dovetailing propositions:

Multiple dying declarations must be assessed independently on their own merits; one cannot be discarded solely because it varies from another if it otherwise inspires confidence.
Minor discrepancies that do not go to the core of the prosecution’s story or that are explained by circumstances do not erode the probative value of a credible declaration.

In Jemaben, the Supreme Court applied these principles to prioritize the first-in-time declaration to a neutral medical professional, medically certified as conscious and capable, and corroborated by scene-of-crime indicators (kerosene odor, container, burn distribution). The Court thereby gives renewed operational clarity to Nallam Veera in cases where formal Executive Magistrate recording is absent but medical contemporaneity and corroboration are present.

Legal Reasoning

Admissibility and Weight of Dying Declaration to a Doctor
The Court affirms that a dying declaration need not be recorded by an Executive Magistrate to be admissible or to form the sole basis of conviction, provided the Court is satisfied about the declarant’s fitness and voluntariness. The treating doctor’s certification that the patient was conscious and able to speak, combined with the immediate recording of the victim’s narration, rendered the declaration reliable. The doctor’s “Yadi” functioned as an independent contemporaneous document linking the declarant’s words to the subsequent investigative steps.
Approach to Multiple Dying Declarations
Rather than rejecting the case due to perceived inconsistencies across three declarations, the Court evaluated the first declaration on its own footing and tested it against independent corroboration. Applying Nallam Veera, the Court treated minor variations as non-fatal and focused on the core consistency: attribution of the act to the appellant, the method (kerosene pour and ignition), and the motive.
Corroborative Circumstances and Forensic Logic
The physical evidence (kerosene smell on body and clothes; kerosene container and kerosene-laden soil at the scene) materially supported the dying declaration. Further, the distribution of burns—100% on the deceased versus 10–12% on the adjacent child—strongly indicated a directed attack rather than an accidental or generalized conflagration. This forensic logic undercut the defense’s accidental-fire theory.
Appellate Interference with Acquittal
The Supreme Court recognized that ordinarily, an acquittal attracts a double presumption of innocence. However, it held that where the evidence, properly appreciated, admits of only one reasonable view—that the accused committed the offense—the High Court is justified in reversing acquittal. Here, the trial court’s focus on minor discrepancies, at the cost of ignoring compelling corroborated evidence, resulted in an unsustainable view. The High Court’s intervention was therefore warranted.

Doctrinal Impact and Future Significance

Strengthening the Evidentiary Role of Medical Declarations: The judgment reaffirms that a dying declaration made to a doctor—especially the first in point of time, contemporaneously recorded and medically certified as conscious and coherent—can, by itself, suffice to ground a conviction, even absent Executive Magistrate recording.
Structured Evaluation of Multiple Declarations: Trial and appellate courts are directed to examine each declaration on its own merits, resist wholesale rejection due to inter-declaration variances, and look for core consistency supported by extrinsic indicators.
Forensic Corroboration as Confidence Multiplier: The Court’s reliance on kerosene smell, the recovered container, and injury distribution will steer future courts to integrate simple but powerful forensic cues when assessing credibility.
Appellate Oversight Over Acquittals: The decision underscores that where a trial court’s approach is overly technical or disregards telling corroboration, appellate reversal is not merely permissible but necessary to avoid miscarriage of justice.
Practical Guidance for Investigators and Clinicians: Immediate documentation by medical officers (including “Yadi” to the police) and explicit notations on the patient’s consciousness and ability to speak significantly bolster prosecutorial robustness in burn cases and other grievous offenses.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Dying Declaration: A statement made by a person as to the cause of their death or the circumstances leading to it. It is an exception to the hearsay rule and can form the sole basis for conviction if found reliable and voluntary.
Multiple Dying Declarations: When a victim makes more than one statement. Courts do not automatically distrust the set; each declaration is assessed independently for credibility. Minor inconsistencies are not fatal if the core narrative remains credible.
Executive Magistrate Recording: While ideal for formal dying declarations, it is not a sine qua non. Declarations to doctors, police, or other persons are admissible if reliability, voluntariness, and mental fitness are established.
Yadi: A hospital intimation/memo sent by a doctor to the police stating the condition of a patient and, where applicable, the patient’s account, alerting authorities to record a formal statement.
Panchnama: A contemporaneous memo prepared in the presence of independent witnesses (panchas) documenting the state of a scene or articles recovered, often critical for corroboration.
Section 302 IPC: Punishes murder with life imprisonment or death; conviction requires proof of culpable homicide with requisite intent or knowledge.
Standard for Reversing Acquittal: Appellate courts are cautious but may reverse an acquittal where the trial court’s view is perverse, ignores vital evidence, or where only one reasonable view supports guilt.

Case Timeline

29/30 November 2004: Incident; victim and child sustain burns; victim hospitalized.
4 December 2004: Victim succumbs to injuries.
5 December 2004: Complaint lodged by Geetaben (PW-1).
Charges: Sections 302, 307, 436, 34, 120-B IPC and Section 135 Bombay Police Act.
19 November 2005: Trial court acquits both accused.
21 July 2016: High Court reverses acquittal qua the appellant; convicts under Section 302 IPC.
29 October 2025: Supreme Court dismisses appeal; conviction affirmed.

Key Holdings and Practical Pointers

The first, doctor-certified dying declaration, made when the patient is conscious and capable, can be sufficient to convict, especially when corroborated by objective forensic cues.
Minor inter-declaration discrepancies are not decisive; courts must identify the core consistency and test it against physical evidence and probabilities.
Absence of Executive Magistrate recording does not defeat the probative force of a trustworthy dying declaration.
Distribution of burns and simple scene indicators (container presence, accelerant odor) can decisively negate accident theories.
High Courts may reverse acquittals where the evidence compels one conclusion and the trial court’s contrary view rests on immaterial variances or ignores corroboration.

Conclusion

Jemaben v. State of Gujarat is a robust restatement of two interlinked doctrines: the evidentiary sufficiency of a reliable, medically certified dying declaration made to a doctor; and the proper judicial approach to multiple dying declarations. By anchoring its analysis in Nallam Veera and by emphasizing objective corroboration (kerosene presence, burn distribution), the Supreme Court provides a pragmatic template for handling burn homicide cases and similar offenses where the victim’s statement is often the linchpin.

The decision also clarifies appellate oversight: acquittals resting on hyper-technical discrepancies, in the teeth of compelling corroborated evidence, cannot stand. Going forward, investigators, medical officers, and trial courts have clearer guidance: document early, certify fitness, capture the victim’s words, secure simple but telling forensic corroboration, and assess each declaration on its own merits. These steps, validated by the Supreme Court here, will materially advance both accuracy and fairness in criminal adjudication.