Mutually Destructive Ocular Testimony and Shifting Crime Scene: Supreme Court mandates benefit of doubt and extends acquittal to non‑appellant co‑convicts under Article 142

Introduction

In KANNAIYA v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2025 INSC 1246), decided on 17 October 2025, the Supreme Court of India (Mehta, J.; Karol, J. concurring) set aside concurrent convictions for murder under Section 302 IPC (including 302 read with 34 IPC) entered against four accused by the First Additional Sessions Judge, Mhow (22 October 1999) and affirmed by the Madhya Pradesh High Court, Indore Bench (9 April 2009).

The case arose from a 1990 village incident in which Ramesh suffered multiple sharp and blunt weapon injuries and later succumbed in hospital. The prosecution narrative shifted between versions: the FIR alleged that the incident began when a group sought to demolish a hut; one eye-witness located the assault in a specific agricultural field; another placed the genesis in front of a neighboring house. The Supreme Court undertook a granular re‑appreciation of the ocular, medical, and site plan evidence and found the prosecution’s ocular versions mutually destructive on the core facets of “genesis” and “situs” of the occurrence. Applying the classic Vadivelu Thevar framework on witness reliability and the “benefit of doubt” doctrine, the Court concluded that conviction could not be sustained. In a notable exercise of Article 142, the Court extended the acquittal to three co‑convicts who had not appealed.

Parties: The appellant was Kannaiya (one of four trial convicts — along with Govardhan, Raja Ram and Bhima). Six others were acquitted by the trial court and their acquittals attained finality. The State of Madhya Pradesh was the respondent.

Summary of the Judgment

• The Supreme Court accepted that Ramesh’s death was homicidal, corroborated by the MLC and post‑mortem (PW‑17 and PW‑18).
• However, the prosecution’s case hinged entirely on two alleged eye‑witnesses: Madho Singh (PW‑5) and Puniya (PW‑12). PW‑2 (informant and father of the deceased) and PW‑3 (hut owner in the FIR version) were declared hostile.
• The Court found PW‑12 to be a “wholly unreliable” witness and PW‑5 to be “partially reliable” whose testimony lacked required independent corroboration (paras 40, 55).
• Critical contradictions:
  • Genesis: FIR alleged demolition of Jagya’s hut; PW‑5 denied any demolition; PW‑12 said he heard commotion and ran to a field.
  • Place: PW‑12 located the assault in Gopya’s field; PW‑5 placed events before a house said to be adjacent to his; the site plan (Exh. P‑6) did not record that house and instead marked the field; no source of light was recorded (paras 49–52, 57).
  • Presence: Each eye‑witness contradicted the presence of the other at the scene (paras 35–37, 47.ii).
  • FIR omission: The FIR (lodged by PW‑2) did not name PW‑12 as an eye‑witness, a material omission in context (paras 38–39).
• Applying Vadivelu Thevar and decisions such as Pankaj v. State of Rajasthan and Bhagwan Sahai v. State of Rajasthan, the Court held that when the genesis and manner/place of the incident are doubtful, conviction cannot stand; benefit of doubt must follow (paras 28, 58–60).
• Result: Conviction and sentence of all four convicts were set aside and they were acquitted. Exercising Article 142, the Court extended this benefit to the three co‑accused who had not appealed (paras 62–64).

Detailed Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras, AIR 1957 SC 614 (para 28):

  The Court reiterated the foundational classification of oral testimony into three categories — wholly reliable, wholly unreliable, and neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. It emphasised that courts must focus on the quality, not quantity, of testimony, convicting on a single witness only if the testimony is beyond reproach. For “partially reliable” witnesses, material corroboration is necessary.

  Application: PW‑12 was categorized as “wholly unreliable,” and PW‑5 as “partially reliable” requiring corroboration, which was absent (paras 40, 55).

• Pankaj v. State of Rajasthan, (2016) 16 SCC 192 (para 58):

  The Supreme Court had held that where the genesis and manner of the incident are doubtful, it is unsafe to uphold a conviction. The “benefit of doubt” principle squarely applies when prosecution evidence lacks credibility.

  Application: The conflicting narratives on both the origin and place of occurrence — coupled with the absence of corroborative features like lighting — brought this case within Pankaj’s ratio.

• Bhagwan Sahai and Another v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2016 SC 2714 (para 59):

  The Court reaffirmed that suppression of the origin/genesis of an occurrence is fatal; in such circumstances, the accused are entitled to the benefit of doubt. Although Bhagwan Sahai also discussed non‑explanation of injuries on the accused, the controlling principle remains that foundational suppression undermines the prosecution case.

  Application: The Supreme Court found that the prosecution shifted/suppressed the genesis (hut‑demolition v. random confrontation v. field assault) and changed the situs of the crime, vitiating the substratum of the case (paras 53, 60–61).

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning is methodical and anchored in established evidentiary principles:

• Uncontested homicidal death:

  The medical evidence (MLC Exh. P‑22 by PW‑17; post‑mortem Exh. P‑23 by PW‑18) established multiple sharp and blunt injuries and a homicidal death (para 26). The question was not “whether” a murder occurred, but “who” committed it and “how” it began.

• Political rivalry as context, not as proof:

  Rival factions existed (para 27). PW‑5 admitted the political divide and ongoing feud (paras 45–46). The Court took this as a cautionary factor requiring stricter scrutiny of ocular testimony for partisanship or embellishment.

• Eyewitness credibility under Vadivelu Thevar:
  • PW‑12 (Puniya) — wholly unreliable (paras 32–41):
    • Shifted place to Gopya’s field (contra FIR’s hut, and contra PW‑5’s version).
    • Claimed solitary presence during assault and claimed immediate retreat, showing no intervention for his cousin Ramesh; later returned after an hour (para 34), a conduct viewed as unnatural in the circumstances (para 37).
    • Omitted in the FIR (a material omission, paras 38–39), despite being closely related and allegedly at/near the supposed genesis (his father’s hut); PW‑3 (his father) also did not mention his presence (para 31).
  • PW‑5 (Madho Singh) — partially reliable (paras 41–55):
    • Placed the initial confrontation before “Narsingh’s house,” claimed to be adjacent to his; site plan (Exh. P‑6), to which he attested, does not mark such a house (para 49).
    • Spoke of a field of “Bholiya” in front of his house; Exh. P‑6 marks incident in “Gopya’s field” and records no such Bholiya (para 51).
    • Denied hut‑demolition genesis (contra FIR, para 52), and claimed that Ramesh was casually with him to smoke a bidi (para 52), a materially different genesis.
    • Asserted he alone was present during assault (para 44–45), thereby contradicting PW‑12’s presence and the FIR’s narration that PW‑2 and PW‑5 together picked up Ramesh (para 54).
    • Claimed to stand two steps away from a multi‑assailant, weapon‑laden attack without sustaining any injury (para 47.vi), a circumstance raising doubt about his presence at the critical moments.

  The Court concluded that PW‑12’s testimony could not be acted upon at all; PW‑5’s version, being partially reliable, demanded independent corroboration, which was lacking (para 55).

• Material contradictions: genesis and situs

  The judgment draws a careful line between minor discrepancies and material contradictions. Where changes go to:

  • Genesis (how and why the occurrence commenced), and
  • Situs (where the assault actually took place),

  the prosecution’s narrative loses its coherence (paras 36, 47, 53, 60). Here, the FIR spoke of a hut‑demolition scenario; PW‑12 relocated to a field; PW‑5 invoked a street‑front confrontation by a neighbor’s house. Such mutually destructive narratives cannot underpin a conviction.

• Site plan and lighting:

  Exh. P‑6 did not record any source of light at night (para 57), an omission undermining the claimed precision with which witnesses attributed specific weapons to specific accused at night. This was central because weapon‑specific allegations were used to differentiate between the four convicts (with sharp weapons) and six acquitted persons (said to be unarmed or with blunt weapons).

• FIR and its omissions:

  The formal FIR was not proved at trial (para 9), a prosecution lapse. Even so, the Court juxtaposed the contemporaneous FIR narrative with ocular versions to assess internal consistency. The non‑mention of PW‑12 (a close relative who claimed to witness the assault at its inception) was treated as a material omission in the specific factual context (paras 38–39), further weakening the prosecution’s edifice.

• Single witness rule and corroboration:

  The Court’s approach is a measured application of the single witness doctrine: conviction can rest on one reliable witness, but not on a partially reliable witness without corroboration; still less on mutually destructive accounts. The Court found no independent corroboration — forensic, circumstantial, or otherwise — that could salvage PW‑5’s partial reliability.

• Benefit of doubt:

  Channeling Pankaj and Bhagwan Sahai, the Court held that when the prosecution suppresses or shifts the origin of the incident and cannot fix the place credibly, it is unsafe to convict. Benefit of doubt is a rule of prudence rooted in the presumption of innocence; it applied squarely here (paras 58–61).

• Article 142 parity relief:

  Although only Kannaiya appealed, the Court acquitted not just him but also Govardhan, Raja Ram and Bhima, invoking Article 142 to extend the same benefit because the infirmities were common and inseparable across the four convicted persons (para 62). This ensures “complete justice” and avoids perpetuating an untenable conviction simply due to the absence of separate appeals by similarly situated co‑convicts.

Impact and Prospective Significance

• Reinforced threshold for ocular evidence in violent night‑time crimes:

  Investigating Officers and prosecutors must anticipate judicial insistence on:

  • Consistency in genesis and situs across FIR, site plan, and testimony;
  • Documentation of lighting conditions when identification/weapon attribution is claimed at night;
  • Prompt mention of material eyewitnesses in the FIR or plausible explanation for omissions.
• Revitalization of Vadivelu Thevar categories:

  This decision is a clear, modern restatement of how courts should treat “wholly unreliable” and “partially reliable” witnesses. Trial courts are reminded not to convict on partially reliable testimony without independent corroboration on material particulars.

• Suppression of genesis is fatal:

  The judgment gives renewed force to the principle that the prosecution must establish how the occurrence began and where it happened with reasonable certainty. Shifting narratives on these pillars will likely translate to acquittal in future cases.

• FIR omissions can be material in context:

  While the FIR is not a substantive piece of evidence, contextual omissions — such as non‑mention of an immediate relative claimed to be an eyewitness, especially in a small village milieu — can materially erode credibility unless convincingly explained.

• Article 142 parity:

  The Court’s readiness to extend acquittal to non‑appellant co‑convicts, where the infirmities are common and indivisible, reaffirms an equitable approach to “complete justice.” Counsel may expect more frequent recourse to this relief in similarly situated group prosecutions, although it remains a discretionary, fact‑sensitive power.

• Investigative and prosecutorial best practices:
  • Ensure site plans capture all landmarks relied upon in testimony (houses, fields), and record lighting sources.
  • Preserve and timely prove FIR and supporting documents; anticipate cross‑examination on omissions.
  • Secure corroboration (CCTV where available, call detail records, neutral witnesses) if relying on a “partially reliable” insider witness.
  • Address motive coherently; “political rivalry” as a vague backdrop will not do the heavy lifting in identification cases.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Genesis of occurrence:

  The “origin story” of the crime — how and why the incident began. A shifting or suppressed genesis suggests embellishment or unreliability.

• Situs (place of occurrence):

  The precise location of the crime. Reliable proof usually includes a consistent site plan and coherent ocular testimony aligned with physical features.

• FIR (First Information Report):

  The earliest report lodged with police. It is not substantive evidence, but its contents can corroborate or contradict witnesses. Material omissions can affect credibility depending on context.

• MLC and Post‑mortem:

  Medico‑Legal Certificate (initial injury assessment) and autopsy report; they establish the nature of injuries, cause of death, and sometimes the type of weapon used. Here, they proved homicidal death but could not, by themselves, fix identity of assailants.

• Section 27, Evidence Act:

  Allows proof of information received from an accused in custody, so far as it distinctly relates to a fact thereby discovered (e.g., recovery of a weapon). Recovery alone rarely suffices to convict where ocular evidence is unreliable and link evidence is weak.

• Vadivelu Thevar categories:

  Witnesses are classified as wholly reliable, wholly unreliable, or partially reliable. Courts may convict on a single wholly reliable witness; partially reliable witnesses require corroboration.

• Benefit of doubt:

  A principle of criminal jurisprudence requiring acquittal when reasonable doubt persists on material elements. It protects the presumption of innocence against infirm prosecution cases.

• Article 142, Constitution of India:

  Empowers the Supreme Court to pass orders necessary for doing complete justice. It can be used to extend relief (e.g., acquittal) to similarly situated non‑appealing co‑convicts when the evidence and infirmities are common and indivisible.

• Sections 302 and 34 IPC:

  Section 302 punishes murder; Section 34 attributes joint liability for acts done with common intention. If the very participation/common intention is doubtful due to unreliable ocular versions, conviction under these provisions cannot stand.

Conclusion

Kannaiya v. State of Madhya Pradesh is a meticulous reaffirmation of bedrock criminal law principles: the primacy of credible, consistent ocular testimony; the indispensability of establishing genesis and place of occurrence; and the need for corroboration where a witness is only partially reliable. The Supreme Court’s application of Vadivelu Thevar, coupled with its reliance on Pankaj and Bhagwan Sahai, underscores that conviction for murder cannot rest on mutually destructive narratives about how and where the crime occurred.

Two aspects stand out. First, the Court’s insistence that omissions in the FIR — such as the non‑mention of a close‑relative eyewitness — can be material in context, especially where the prosecution’s story already suffers from shifting genesis and situs. Second, the Court’s exercise of Article 142 to extend acquittal to non‑appellant co‑convicts highlights an equitable, parity‑based approach to complete justice where evidentiary infirmities are common and indivisible.

Key takeaways:

• Quality, not quantity, governs the assessment of eyewitnesses; “partially reliable” testimony without corroboration cannot sustain a conviction for murder.
• Contradictions on the genesis and location of the incident are material and typically fatal to the prosecution’s case.
• Investigators must meticulously document lighting and landmarks in site plans where night‑time identification and weapon attribution are asserted.
• Article 142 can be invoked to extend acquittal to similarly placed co‑convicts who have not appealed, to avoid perpetuating an injustice.

In the broader criminal justice landscape, this decision will likely sharpen trial‑level discipline in investigating and presenting homicide cases while reinforcing appellate scrutiny where ocular evidence is internally inconsistent on foundational facts. It is, in short, a robust restatement of the “benefit of doubt” rule when the prosecution’s narrative is both shifting and mutually destructive at its core.