Affirming Section 79(3)(b) Takedown Powers and Rule 3(1)(d) Validity: Karnataka High Court upholds the Sahyog Portal and limits intermediaries’ Article 19 claims

Introduction

In X Corp v. Union of India, decided on 24 September 2025, the Karnataka High Court (M. Nagaprasanna, J.) delivered a sweeping and historically anchored judgment on intermediary liability, online speech regulation, and constitutional rights in the digital age. The petitioner, X Corp (erstwhile Twitter), sought:

A declaration that Section 79(3)(b) of the IT Act does not authorize information blocking and that only Section 69A read with the 2009 Blocking Rules can be used for blocking.
A declaration that Rule 3(1)(d) of the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 (IT Rules 2021) is ultra vires/unconstitutional (or must be read down to preclude takedown orders).
A declaration that the Sahyog Portal is ultra vires/unconstitutional.
Quashing of multiple central/state notifications designating “authorized agencies/nodal officers” empowered to issue takedown notices.

The Union of India, supported by intervenors, defended the validity of the statutory regime, emphasized the exponential growth and harms of online content, and argued that Article 19 rights are citizen-centric and not available to foreign companies. The case raised large constitutional questions about the reach of Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015), the scope of Section 79 safe harbour, the independence of Section 69A and 79 pathways, and the permissibility of administrative facilitation through the Sahyog Portal.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court framed eleven issues and ruled decisively in favour of the State. Key holdings include:

Regulation of communication is endemic to civilization; India and other jurisdictions have always regulated the flow of information across media.
Article 19(1)(a) is not absolute; it is hedged by Article 19(2)’s reasonable restrictions.
American free speech doctrines cannot be transplanted wholesale into Indian constitutional law; Reno v. ACLU (1997) is of limited contemporary persuasive value, and post-Reno U.S. jurisprudence has evolved.
Shreya Singhal dealt with the IT Rules 2011; those rules were superseded in 2021. The 2021 framework is materially distinct and must be analyzed afresh.
Rule 3(1)(d) of the IT Rules 2021 is constitutional and not vague. It operates in tandem with Section 79 as a due diligence condition, requiring takedown of information “prohibited under any law for the time being in force,” tied to Article 19(2) grounds.
Section 79(3)(b) authorizes “appropriate Government or its agency” to notify an intermediary that content is being used to commit an unlawful act; failure to remove/disable expeditiously can result in loss of safe harbour under Section 79(1).
Section 69A blocking (with its procedural safeguards) and Section 79(3)(b) takedown (linked to safe harbour) are distinct pathways. Section 69A is not the exclusive route to content removal.
The Sahyog Portal is a facilitative administrative mechanism to route lawful notices by notified authorized agencies; it is not a “censorship portal” and is intra vires.
Article 19 rights are citizen-centric. A foreign company cannot invoke Article 19(1)(a); it cannot, under the guise of Article 14, accomplish what Article 19 forbids.
Algorithms are not autonomous; they are designed and deployed by humans and can be regulated.
Given the “menace” of social media harms—especially to women—regulation is a constitutional imperative; unregulated speech risks lawlessness.

The writ petition, and applications by intervenors, were dismissed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The Court’s reasoning is richly sourced, traversing India’s free speech canon and comparative materials to draw clear doctrinal boundaries:

Romesh Thapar v. State of Madras; Brij Bhushan v. State of Delhi; State of Madras v. V.G. Row; Ram Manohar Lohia (1960; 1966); Virendra v. State of Punjab: Developed the “public order” spectrum and proximity tests for restrictions under Article 19(2), emphasizing reasonableness in context.
Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015): Struck down Section 66A; upheld Section 69A and the 2009 Blocking Rules; read down Section 79 and the 2011 Intermediary Rules’ notice-and-takedown regime to require court/government notice tied to Article 19(2). Crucially, this judgment pertained to the 2011 Rules.
Ajit Mohan v. Legislative Assembly (2022): Recognized the vast power and responsibility of intermediaries like Facebook in shaping democratic discourse and their accountability.
Just Rights for Children Alliance v. S. Harish (2024): Reiterated intermediaries’ due diligence and safe harbour under Section 79 with obligations to act on unlawful content.
On transplanting U.S. jurisprudence: A line of Constitution Bench decisions—Babulal Parate; Madhu Limaye; Ramlila Maidan—caution against importing U.S. doctrines, noting structural differences and the express reasonableness limits in Article 19(2).
On corporations and Article 19: Indo-China Steam Navigation Co.; TELCO; Charanjit Lal; Indian Social Action Forum and others stress that Article 19 rights belong to “citizens” and cannot be invoked by foreign companies; Article 14 cannot be used as a backdoor to assert Article 19.

Comparative references—in particular, post-Reno U.S. Supreme Court cases (NetChoice/Moody; TikTok v. Garland; Free Speech Coalition v. Paxton) and ECHR cases (Delfi; Magyar; Sanchez; Editorial Board)—were employed to demonstrate an international trend toward regulating platforms and imposing due diligence and liability under specific contexts. The Court uses these not as binding but as persuasive corroboration for regulatory approaches.

Legal Reasoning

1) The historical and constitutional case for regulation

The Court’s “prologue” and Issue No. 1–3 analyses are a constitutional and cultural primer: media has never been unregulated; Article 19(1)(a) is explicitly qualified by 19(2). Invoking Constituent Assembly debates and early free speech jurisprudence, the Court situates modern digital regulation within a continuum of public order, sovereignty, decency, and morality concerns. Speech is the “cornerstone of liberty,” but under the Constitution it is not unfettered.

2) Why Shreya Singhal does not control the 2021 regime

The Court draws a sharp line: Shreya Singhal interpreted the 2011 Rules, which were superseded. Rule 3(1)(d) of the 2021 Rules is textually and structurally different. It requires intermediaries, upon receiving actual knowledge via a court order or notification by an authorized government agency under Section 79(3)(b), not to host/store/publish “unlawful information,” defined by reference to “any law for the time being in force,” tied to 19(2)-equivalent categories, with a 36-hour compliance window.

Section 69A (blocking the public’s access, with 2009 Blocking Rules safeguards) and Section 79 (safe harbour conditioned by due diligence/takedown obligations) are complementary but distinct. Section 69A is not exclusive. This dual-path structure is a deliberate legislative design, not a circumvention of Shreya’s safeguards.

3) Vagueness challenge rejected

The Rule 3(1)(d) vagueness plea was dismissed for multiple reasons:

The trigger is “unlawful information” prohibited under “any law for the time being in force”—a definite and ascertainable standard rooted in existing statutes and Article 19(2) grounds.
Section 79(3)(b) requires “actual knowledge” by notification of the appropriate government or its agency (or court order). The authorized-agency requirement narrows discretion.
As in A.K. Roy and Benilal, mathematical precision is not demanded where context is clear and implementable. Courts and administrators can reasonably apply such standards.

4) The Sahyog Portal as facilitation, not censorship

The Court accepts the Union’s detailed explanation: Sahyog is a central routing platform for lawful notices under Section 79(3)(b) read with Rule 3(1)(d), intended to resolve chronic operational issues reported by law enforcement and intermediaries (lack of reliable contacts; duplicative/unclear notices; delays; non-compliance; lack of audit trails). It onboards only duly notified “authorized agencies”/nodal officers and intermediaries. Power to block public access under Section 69A remains with the statutorily designated machinery. The Portal does not create new substantive powers—it streamlines communication and accountability. Hence, it is intra vires and constitutionally unobjectionable.

5) Article 19 is citizen-centric; foreign intermediaries lack standing

Echoing settled law, the Court holds that X Corp, a foreign company, cannot invoke Article 19(1)(a). It cannot employ Article 14 as a vehicle to achieve what Article 19 forbids. While Article 14/21 are broadly available to “persons,” pleas that effectively depend on Article 19 cannot be smuggled in through Article 14.

6) Algorithms as human agency

Rejecting the notion that algorithmic curation absolves intermediaries, the Court observes that algorithms are designed, trained, and governed by human choices. Their amplification and prioritization dynamics produce real-world effects; regulation can therefore reach them without violating the “neutrality” myth.

7) The “menace” of social media and the constitutional need to regulate

The judgment mounts an extensive evidentiary canvas—academic research, UN reports, and comparative policy—to underscore the harms: misinformation and disinformation; threats, cyberstalking, and doxing; image-based sexual abuse and deepfakes; misogynist ecosystems targeting women in public life; and broader psychological and social injuries. This empirical record fuels the constitutional balancing in favour of measured regulation to protect dignity, order, and democratic integrity.

Impact

For intermediaries

Operational compliance: Intermediaries must maintain robust Rule 3(1) compliance programs, including rapid triage and 36-hour removal for court/authorized-agency notifications under Section 79(3)(b).
Safe harbour risk: Non-compliance risks losing Section 79(1) safe harbour (and exposure to primary liability under substantive laws).
Sahyog integration: Expect centralized and authenticated notice-routing via Sahyog; plan for API integration, SLAs, and auditable workflows.
Governance of algorithms: Design choices about amplification/curation may attract regulatory scrutiny; human oversight is expected.

For government and enforcement agencies

Authorized agencies: Central and state designations are validated; agencies should ensure notices are precise, lawful, and time-stamped for accountability.
Dual-path content regulation: Continue to use Section 69A for blocking public access (with due process) and Section 79(3)(b) notifications for safe-harbour-linked takedowns.
Sahyog as governance infrastructure: Use the Portal to standardize notices, track compliance, reduce duplication, and ensure timely action.

For users and civil society

Free speech boundaries clarified: The judgment reiterates that online speech is constitutionally protected but subject to lawful, proportionate limits under Article 19(2).
Gendered harms: The Court’s focus on women’s safety signals a stronger official stance against image-based abuse, deepfakes, and targeted harassment.
Transparency and remedies: Sahyog and authorization requirements should improve traceability and offer clearer points of escalation.

Legislative and judicial trajectory

Shreya Singhal remains central but confined to the 2011 rules; future challenges will be framed around the 2021 regime and its implementation safeguards.
The Solicitor General hinted at a possible review of Shreya Singhal; any such development will likely be Supreme Court terrain.
The judgment’s strong stance on Article 19 standing may shape locus and pleading strategies in future intermediary litigation.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Safe Harbour (Section 79): A conditional shield from liability for intermediaries (e.g., social media platforms) for third-party content, provided they follow due diligence and act on lawful notices to remove unlawful content.
Section 69A vs Section 79(3)(b): Section 69A empowers government to block public access to content via a structured process with specific safeguards. Section 79(3)(b) concerns takedown obligations linked to safe harbour—intermediaries must remove/disable unlawful content upon court order or notification by an authorized government agency.
Rule 3(1)(d) (IT Rules 2021): Requires intermediaries to remove unlawful content within 36 hours when notified by a court or authorized government agency, referencing 19(2)-like grounds.
“Unlawful information”: Content prohibited under any law (e.g., criminal provisions, contempt, defamation) or by court order in relation to sovereignty, public order, decency, etc.
Authorized Agency/Nodal Officer: A government officer notified as competent to issue Section 79(3)(b) notices; ensures authenticity and accountability of takedown communications.
Sahyog Portal: A centralized, authenticated digital channel for routing and tracking takedown notices and intermediary responses. It does not itself censor; it facilitates lawful communications.
Vagueness Doctrine: A law is unconstitutionally vague if people cannot understand what it prohibits or allows. Here, “unlawful information under any law” is concrete and determinable; therefore, Rule 3(1)(d) passes the test.
Article 19 standing: Fundamental freedoms in Article 19 are reserved for citizens. Foreign companies cannot invoke Article 19(1)(a) even if they operate in India.

Conclusion

X Corp v. Union of India is a landmark recalibration of intermediary liability and online speech regulation under India’s constitutional scheme. Its core contributions are threefold:

It validates a dual-path regulatory architecture: Section 69A blocking with procedural safeguards; and Section 79(3)(b) takedown linked to conditional safe harbour and Rule 3(1)(d)’s due diligence.
It affirms the legality and utility of the Sahyog Portal as a facilitative, not censorial, instrument for lawful, authenticated communication between authorized agencies and intermediaries.
It clarifies that Article 19 rights belong to citizens alone and cannot be invoked by foreign intermediaries to resist lawful regulation in India.

The judgment does not merely decide a dispute between a platform and the State; it sets a constitutional roadmap for the governance of digital public spaces, recognizing both the emancipatory power and the corrosive potential of modern platforms. By confining Shreya Singhal to the 2011 rules, rejecting the vagueness challenge to Rule 3(1)(d), and demanding accountable algorithmic governance, the Court has signalled that in India’s democracy, liberty and regulation “must walk a tight rope” together—so that free expression thrives within the rule of law, and not at its expense.