Article 233 Recast: In‑service Judicial Officers Now Eligible for Direct Recruitment as District Judges — Dheeraj Mor Overruled; Seven‑Year Combined Experience and Age 35 Minimum Mandated

Introduction

In a landmark Constitution Bench ruling, the Supreme Court of India in Rejanish K.V. v. K. Deepa and Others, 2025 INSC 1208 (decided on 09‑10‑2025), has fundamentally reinterpreted Article 233 of the Constitution. The Court held that posts of District Judges (including Additional District Judges) to be filled by direct recruitment are open not only to advocates but also to serving judicial officers. The Bench—comprising B.R. Gavai, CJI (authoring the majority), and Justices Aravind Kumar, Satish Chandra Sharma, K. Vinod Chandran, with a concurring opinion by Justice M.M. Sundresh—overruled the long-standing line of authority from Satya Narain Singh (1985) through Dheeraj Mor (2020), which had confined the 25% “direct recruitment” channel to practicing advocates alone.

The judgment arises from references framed in 2017–2025 challenging the correctness of the interpretation in Dheeraj Mor v. High Court of Delhi (2020), which required continuous 7 years’ practice at the Bar as an eligibility condition for direct recruitment and excluded serving judicial officers from that channel. The constitutional questions centered on who can be recruited as District Judges under Article 233, when eligibility is to be tested, and whether any quota is reserved for advocates.

Summary of the Judgment

The Constitution Bench answers the reference in the following terms:

• Direct recruitment to the post of District Judge is open to two sources: (a) advocates/pleaders, and (b) persons already in judicial service. Article 233(1) governs appointment, posting and promotion; Article 233(2) prescribes additional qualifications only for candidates “not already in service” (i.e., the advocate stream). It does not bar in‑service judicial officers from direct recruitment.
• Eligibility is to be assessed on the date of application (not on the date of appointment).
• To ensure a level playing field, an in‑service judicial officer must have a combined minimum of seven years’ continuous experience as an advocate and/or as a judicial officer immediately preceding the application. The same combined-counting principle applies to an advocate who has prior judicial service.
• Breaks in practice that create a disconnect with the profession cannot be aggregated (e.g., a 5‑year practice, then a 10‑year hiatus, then 2‑year practice cannot be clubbed). The seven years must be continuous in the immediate past, but can be a continuous combination of practice and judicial service.
• The minimum age for both categories (advocates and in‑service judicial officers) is 35 years as on the date of application. The Court left the maximum age to be set by rules, if at all, consistently with constitutional norms.
• The 50:25:25 distribution remains: 50% by promotion on merit‑cum‑seniority (with suitability test), 25% by limited departmental competitive examination (LDCE) from judicial service, and 25% by direct recruitment. However, that 25% “direct” stream is not an exclusive quota for advocates; it is open to both eligible advocates and eligible in‑service judicial officers.
• The contrary view in Satya Narain Singh (1985) through Dheeraj Mor (2020) “does not lay down the correct proposition of law” and stands overruled.
• Prospective operation: Completed selection processes and appointments prior to this judgment remain undisturbed (save where interim orders exist). State Governments, in consultation with High Courts, must amend rules to align with this judgment within three months.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The Court undertakes a meticulous reconciliation of constitutional text, structure, and precedent across Articles 233–237, with these cases shaping the final view:

• Rameshwar Dayal v. State Of Punjab (1960): A Constitution Bench characterized Article 233 as a self‑contained code for appointing District Judges. It drew a key distinction:
  • For those already in service (which later case law clarifies as “judicial service”), Article 233(1) prescribes no special qualification beyond appointment by the Governor in consultation with the High Court.
  • For those not already in service (the “advocate/pleader” stream), Article 233(2) imposes the seven‑year practice and High Court recommendation condition.
  The case also resisted a rigid grammatical reading of “has been,” foreshadowing a purposive, non‑pedantic constitutional interpretation.
• Chandra Mohan v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1966): Another Constitution Bench construed “the service” in Article 233(2) as “judicial service” (per Article 236(b)). It invalidated recruitment of executive “judicial officers” as District Judges, thereby reinforcing separation of judiciary from executive, but did not bar in‑service judicial officers (properly so called) from direct recruitment. It also articulated the dual source: (i) service (judicial), (ii) Bar.
• State Of Assam v. Kuseswar Saikia (1969): Clarified that appointment and promotion “to be” District Judges fall under Article 233(1); the term “District Judge” includes Additional District Judges. Both initial appointment and initial promotion are within Article 233(1).
• A. Panduranga Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1975): Emphasized that direct recruitment from the Bar requires a High Court recommendation—cementing the High Court’s constitutional primacy for the Bar stream.
• Satya Narain Singh v. High Court of Allahabad (1985): A three‑Judge Bench read Article 233 as maintaining an impermeable dichotomy between advocates and those “already in service,” confining direct recruitment to advocates alone. The present Constitution Bench finds that reading erroneous, inconsistent with the constitutional scheme and earlier Constitution Bench dicta.
• Sushma Suri v. GNCTD (1999): Held that certain law officers (e.g., Public Prosecutors/Government Counsel) who are on the rolls and appear in court are “advocates” for Article 233(2). More importantly, it warned against a “pedantic” approach and favored broad‑based recruitment to secure the “best talent.”
• Deepak Aggarwal v. Keshav Kaushik (2013): Affirmed Sushma Suri’s approach: the decisive test is whether the candidate continues to “act and/or plead” in court despite employment; if yes, they remain an advocate. The present Bench distinguishes that case’s factual focus (law officers) and rejects its extension to exclude in‑service judges from the direct stream.
• Vijay Kumar Mishra v. High Court of Patna (2016): Allowed in‑service candidates to participate in the direct selection without resigning, positing Article 233(2) as a bar only at appointment stage. Later overruled by Dheeraj Mor; the present Bench sets a new, coherent framework: eligibility at application, with combined experience rules.
• Dheeraj Mor v. High Court of Delhi (2020): Confined direct recruitment to practicing advocates with continuous 7‑year practice both on the cut‑off date and at appointment; excluded in‑service judicial officers. The present Bench decisively overrules Dheeraj Mor and the entire line from Satya Narain.
• All India Judges’ Association v. Union of India (2002) and later iterations: Fixed the 50:25:25 cadre composition and roster guidance. The present Court preserves this structure but clarifies that the “25% direct” is not a quota exclusively reserved for advocates; it is a direct intake channel open to both eligible streams.

Legal Reasoning

• Textual and contextual interpretation avoiding redundancy: Relying on RBI v. Peerless and Hansoli Devi, the Court reads Article 233 holistically. Article 233(1) is the source for appointments, postings and promotions—covering initial appointments and promotions alike—with the Governor acting in consultation with the High Court. Article 233(2) superadds a qualification only for those “not already in the service” (the advocate stream). Reading 233(2) as a bar against in‑service candidates would render the opening words (“a person not already in the service…”) otiose—an interpretive outcome the Court refuses to accept.
• Constitutional scheme of Articles 233–237 and “judicial service”: Following Chandra Mohan, “the service” in Article 233(2) means judicial service as defined in Article 236(b). The entire chapter is designed to protect judicial independence (Article 50; separation of powers) and to vest control in the High Courts (Article 235), hence appointments of District Judges are deliberately insulated from executive/service‑wide norms and the Public Service Commission (which Article 234 engages only for “persons other than district judges”).
• Equal opportunity and merit: Excluding serving judicial officers from competing in the direct stream violates the equality norm under Articles 14 and 16, and undermines the objective of securing the “best and most suitable” candidates (see Leela Dhar and Tej Prakash Pathak). The Bench emphasizes broad‑based competition to elevate the quality of the district judiciary.
• Experience calibration—combined, continuous, and current: The Court harmonizes two realities: (i) earlier practice at the Bar, and (ii) judicial experience on the Bench. It mandates a continuous seven‑year chain in the immediate past, which may be formed by a seamless combination of practice and judicial service. Long breaks that sever “connect” are impermissible.
• Advocates Act and Bar Council rules context: The Court notes that a lawyer who joins the judicial service suspends the right to practice (remains on the Bar roll but cannot practice during service), and may resume later under Bar Council rules. This informs the legitimacy of counting pre‑service practice together with judicial service for the seven‑year benchmark.
• Stare decisis and prospective overruling: Recognizing that a six‑decade line of cases entrenched a contrary view, the Court clarifies that doctrine is not inflexible, especially where constitutional interpretation is in error and ongoing public interest is harmed. It corrects course prospectively, preserving concluded selections (absent interim directions).
• Concurring opinion (Sundresh, J.): Emphasizes the doctrine of constitutional silence: the Constitution purposefully refrains from prescribing a qualification for in‑service candidates, leaving it to the High Courts and Governor to calibrate via rules. He grounds the outcome in separation of powers and judicial independence, and reads “eligible” in Article 233(2) as “qualified,” recognizing two distinct qualifications (advocate stream; judicial service stream) for the same office. He also draws support from Article 233‑A’s validation clause, which textually places both sources (in‑service and Bar) on equal footing.

Impact

This judgment is transformative. Its immediate and systemic effects include:

• Rulemaking within three months: All States, in consultation with their High Courts, must amend recruitment rules to:
  • Open direct recruitment to both advocates and in‑service judicial officers.
  • Incorporate the seven‑year continuous combined experience requirement and the age‑35 minimum.
  • Align the selection architecture (syllabus, evaluation, weightages) for a single, common competition without any in‑service “weightage.”
• Bar’s role re‑balanced: The “25% direct” is no longer an advocates‑only corridor. The pool widens, deepening competition and likely raising the threshold of merit. Advocates with sustained, active courtroom practice remain fully eligible, as clarified in Sushma Suri and Deepak Aggarwal.
• Judicial service morale and mobility: Talented Civil Judges with substantial bar experience can target the direct channel earlier, rather than waiting solely on seniority‑cum‑merit or LDCE pathways. This may catalyze human capital optimization across the district judiciary.
• Uniformity and federal coherence: Although recruitment is a State subject, the Court’s directions push toward nationwide uniformity—minimizing litigation about eligibility and opening conditions.
• Transitional certainty: The prospective operation clause reduces disruption: past recruitments stand; only ongoing matters with interim orders will now be disposed in light of this ruling.
• Quality and independence: The decision fortifies the judiciary’s independence by reinforcing High Courts’ constitutional centrality and by democratizing access to the office of District Judge, consistent with Articles 233–235.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Article 233(1) vs Article 233(2):
  • 233(1): The appointing power and process—appointments “to be” District Judges, postings, promotions—vested in the Governor in consultation with the High Court.
  • 233(2): An additional qualification for candidates “not already in service” (i.e., advocates/pleaders): at least seven years as an advocate/pleader and recommendation by the High Court.
  • Key insight: 233(2) does not exclude in‑service judicial officers from direct recruitment; it simply adds conditions for the Bar stream.
• “Service” means “judicial service”: Per Article 236(b) and Chandra Mohan, “the service” in Article 233(2) is the judicial service (a cadre exclusively intended to fill civil judicial posts up to District Judge), not any executive or civil post.
• Eligibility vs Qualification: The Court treats “eligible” in Article 233(2) as “qualified.” There are two pathways to qualification: (1) judicial service, (2) advocate with seven years and High Court recommendation. States/High Courts can set additional, neutral criteria (minimum age, continuous experience) through rules for a level playing field.
• Combined and continuous experience: The seven years must be a single continuous chain immediately preceding the application date. The chain may consist of practice, service, or a seamless combination (e.g., 3 years’ practice + 4 years’ judicial service, back‑to‑back), but long gaps cannot be patched together.
• High Court’s role—consultation vs recommendation:
  • For the Bar stream, Article 233(2) explicitly requires the High Court’s “recommendation.”
  • For in‑service candidates (including promotions and direct appointments), Article 233(1) mandates “consultation.”
  • Either way, the High Court’s primacy remains the constitutional constant across both streams.
• Stare decisis and prospective effect: Even long‑standing precedents may be revisited in constitutional cases when they misread the Constitution or harm public interest. To protect settled expectations, this ruling applies prospectively, with limited exceptions.
• Not a “quota” for advocates: The 25% “direct recruitment” segment is not reserved solely for advocates. Both eligible advocates and in‑service judicial officers compete for the same direct‑recruit posts.

Practical Guidance for Stakeholders

• For State Governments and High Courts (within three months):
  • Amend judicial service rules to:
    • Open direct recruitment to eligible in‑service judicial officers (and continue for advocates).
    • Specify seven‑year continuous combined experience criterion and age 35 minimum as on application date.
    • Prescribe a common competitive process (written + viva) without any preferential weightage for in‑service candidates.
    • Clarify how minor administrative gaps (transition dates) are treated, while excluding substantial breaks.
  • Ensure rosters and cadre composition continue to reflect the 50:25:25 distribution.
• For in‑service judicial officers:
  • Compute your immediate past seven years as a continuous chain of practice + service (if applicable).
  • Confirm you meet the minimum age of 35 on the application date.
  • No pre‑resignation is mandated for participation (the judgment is silent on any requirement to resign before applying).
• For advocates:
  • Maintain clear, current proof of active practice (appearances, filings) consistent with Sushma Suri and Deepak Aggarwal.
  • If you have prior judicial service, your continuous service period can be combined to reach seven years.

Why This Decision Matters

The judgment restores fidelity to the constitutional text and structure: Article 233(1) is the universal source of the Governor’s power—under the High Court’s constitutional supervision—to appoint, post, and promote District Judges; Article 233(2) sets an additional threshold for the Bar stream. It revives the two genuine sources of appointment (judicial service and Bar), as envisioned by the framers and the early Constitution Benches, and decisively rejects the later, judge‑made narrowing that effectively created a reserved “advocates‑only” direct channel.

Equally, the Court’s insistence on a continuous seven‑year, immediate‑past experience—open to combination across practice and service—strikes a principled middle path. It deters opportunistic aggregation of remote practice periods while recognizing the rich adjudicatory experience of judicial officers. The age‑35 floor further aligns the two streams, ensuring maturity and a comparable playing field.

Conclusion

Rejanish K.V. v. K. Deepa re‑centers Article 233 on its constitutional fundamentals: dual sources of talent, High Court primacy, and a broad‑based search for merit. By overruling Satya Narain Singh and Dheeraj Mor, the Supreme Court has opened the direct recruitment channel to in‑service judicial officers subject to a uniform, neutral eligibility framework—seven‑year continuous combined experience and a minimum age of 35—while preserving the established 50:25:25 structure and protecting concluded selections.

The judgment promises to elevate the calibre of the district judiciary by widening the talent pool and by harmonizing constitutional text with practical institutional needs. Its impact will be felt not only in recruitment rules and exams across States, but also in the quality, independence, and public trust in the first judicial tier where most citizens experience justice.