"Exceptional Services" Fees May Include Equipment Charges: Connecticut Supreme Court Recasts § 14-63-36c(c) as a Posting Requirement, Not a Labor-Only Cap

Introduction

In Modzelewski's Towing & Storage, Inc. v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles (Conn. Sept. 23, 2025), the Supreme Court of Connecticut resolved a recurring, industry-shaping dispute about how towing companies may bill for “exceptional services” during nonconsensual tows—particularly those involving specialized, high-cost equipment such as rotator trucks. After a highway accident led the State Police to summon Modzelewski’s Towing, the wrecker service deployed a 75-ton rotator and other specialized resources to clear and transport a severely damaged tractor-trailer insured by Sentry Select Insurance Company. The resulting invoice included substantial equipment-based charges. Sentry paid under protest and then complained to the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV), which found overcharging and ordered restitution and a civil penalty. The trial court and Appellate Court largely upheld the DMV, reading the regulations to allow only hourly labor-based charges for exceptional services.

The Supreme Court reversed in part. It held that § 14-63-36c(c) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies is ambiguous and, properly interpreted, permits towing services to charge additional fees for exceptional services that include the cost of using specialized equipment, provided those fees are itemized and posted in the same manner that hourly labor charges must be posted under § 14-65j-3. The Court rejected the view that exceptional-services fees must be tethered exclusively to hourly labor rates and concluded that “itemized in accordance with the hourly charge for labor posted” is best read as a posting/notice requirement, not a pricing formula. The case was remanded to the agency for a new hearing consistent with this interpretation.

Summary of the Opinion

• The regulation at issue, § 14-63-36c(c), allows licensed wreckers to charge “additional fees for exceptional services” that are “reasonable and necessary” for nonconsensual tows, and requires those fees to be “itemized in accordance with the hourly charge for labor posted” per § 14-65j-3.
• The Court found the provision ambiguous but adopted the interpretation that:
  • “Itemized in accordance with the hourly charge for labor posted” refers to a posting and itemization requirement modeled on the labor-rate signage rules in § 14-65j-3; and
  • It does not cap exceptional-services fees at, or require them to be calculated solely as, hourly labor charges.
• Wrecker services may therefore include equipment-use charges for exceptional services, so long as those fees are:
  • Reasonable and necessary for the particular nonconsensual tow,
  • Itemized and posted (on a sign conforming to § 14-65j-3’s format), and
  • Itemized separately on the invoice, with records maintained to explain and justify the additional services.
• The Court rejected the DMV’s argument that equipment costs should be recouped only through the uniform hourly rate for nonconsensual tows, noting that the regulatory definition of “hourly rate” expressly excludes exceptional services and that building equipment costs into a universal hourly rate would unfairly force customers without exceptional services to subsidize those who require them.
• Remedy: The Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court in part, vacated the restitution and penalty, and remanded for a new DMV hearing applying the correct interpretation. One discrete Appellate Court ruling (denial of the request to dismiss Sentry’s complaint against Modzelewski’s Towing & Recovery, Inc.) was left undisturbed.
• Context: The Court’s reading aligns with fresh legislative reforms in Public Act 25-55 (2025), which explicitly authorize additional charges for exceptional services that may include both labor and equipment use, if itemized, reasonable, and necessary.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

• Meriden v. Freedom of Information Commission, 338 Conn. 310 (2021): Standard of review. Pure questions of law not owed deference; de novo review when agency construction is not time-tested.
• Connecticut Motor Cars v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 300 Conn. 617 (2011): De novo review for regulatory interpretation questions.
• Okeke v. Commissioner of Public Health, 304 Conn. 317 (2012): Courts expound and apply governing legal principles; regulatory construction treated akin to statutory interpretation.
• Williams v. General Nutrition Centers, Inc., 326 Conn. 651 (2017): Plain meaning rule applies to regulations as to statutes (General Statutes § 1-2z).
• Cochran v. Dept. of Transportation, 350 Conn. 844 (2024): Resort to dictionary definitions for undefined terms or phrases.
• Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Board of Education, 270 Conn. 665 (2004): Cross-references can illuminate statutory meaning.
• State v. White, 204 Conn. 410 (1987); Pereira v. State Board of Education, 304 Conn. 1 (2012): Agencies are creatures of statute; Legislature may set purpose and authorize agencies to “fill in details.” Applied here to § 14-66 and the Commissioner’s rate-setting and regulatory authority.
• Jim’s Auto Body v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 285 Conn. 794 (2008): Dealer/repairer statutes aim to regulate industry and protect consumers from unfair practices. Supports interpreting the posting requirement as a transparency tool.
• American Promotional Events, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 285 Conn. 192 (2008): Anti-surplusage canon; supports giving effect to the posting requirement even in nonconsensual contexts.

Legal Reasoning

The core interpretive task was whether § 14-63-36c(c)’s phrase—“Any such additional fees shall be itemized in accordance with the hourly charge for labor posted by the licensed towing service, as required by the provisions of section 14-65j-3”—is (a) a directive that exceptional-services fees must be calculated solely as hourly labor charges, or (b) a directive that exceptional-services fees must be itemized and posted in conformity with the labor-rate signage rules of § 14-65j-3. The Supreme Court held the regulation ambiguous, found both readings facially plausible, and chose the latter as the more coherent and administrable construction.

Several interlocking points drove the Court’s analysis:

• Text and Dictionary Use: The Court gave ordinary meaning to “itemize” (“set down in detail or by particulars”) and “in accordance with” (“agreement” or “conformity”). The natural reading, in light of § 14-65j-3’s signage requirements, is that exceptional-services fees must be listed and displayed in conformity with how the hourly labor rate is posted—not that those fees must equal or be derived from the labor rate.
• Cross-Reference to § 14-65j-3: Section 14-65j-3 is a display rule. It specifies the size, heading, typographical format, and placement for a “Charges and Conditions” sign, including how the hourly labor charge must be shown where customer work orders are placed. The cross-reference thus informs how to present exceptional-services fees (visibility and itemization), not what those fees must be (a labor-only formula).
• Structure and Definitions Within the Same Regulatory Scheme: The “hourly rate” is a uniform, Commissioner-set maximum charge for nonconsensual towing of heavy vehicles. The regulations explicitly exclude “exceptional services” from that hourly rate. If exceptional-services costs (including expensive equipment usage) could only be recovered through the hourly rate, the exclusion would be rendered incoherent, and customers requiring no exceptional services would subsidize others who do—contrary to the structure and fairness concerns embedded in the scheme.
• Practical Coherence with State Police Rotation Program: Separate regulations governing the State Police rotation list (Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 29-23a-1 et seq.) require heavy-duty wrecker operators to have access to specialized support items and sometimes specifically a rotator. Those capital-intensive requirements would be irrational if the regulatory billing rules simultaneously prevented recovery of special equipment costs when actually deployed for exceptional services. The Court’s reading avoids disincentivizing participation in the rotation system.
• Consumer Protection and Transparency Remain: Although equipment fees are permitted, they are conditioned on necessity, reasonableness, transparent posting, and itemized invoicing—with documentary support. The Commissioner retains authority to require justification and to disallow unreasonable or unnecessary charges. The regime balances industry viability and public protection.

The Court also rejected the Commissioner’s claim that the uniform hourly rate already accounts for wrecker operating costs, including specialized equipment. By definition, the hourly rate excludes exceptional services. Embedding infrequent but extremely costly equipment into a uniform hourly rate would force cross-subsidies by customers not receiving those services and could produce windfalls for operators not investing in such equipment, especially those not on the rotation list.

Interplay with the State Police Rotation List

The opinion gives significant weight to the regulatory overlay in Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 29-23a-1 et seq., which:

• Establishes the State Police rotational system used when a vehicle owner/operator is incapacitated or defers to the trooper at scene.
• Requires heavy-duty wrecker operators to meet stringent capability, response-time, training, and equipment standards, including availability of rotators/cranes and air compressors.

These requirements presuppose that operators can economically sustain those investments. Denying recovery of equipment-use costs for exceptional services would undermine the rotation system’s functionality, particularly for catastrophic incidents involving heavy commercial vehicles. The Court’s interpretation protects the system’s integrity by allowing targeted, transparently posted equipment charges when such resources are actually and reasonably deployed.

Relationship to 2025 Legislative Reforms (Public Act 25-55)

Although the Court resolved the case under existing regulations, it noted that the 2025 legislative reforms in Public Act 25-55 (effective October 1, 2025) dovetail with its interpretation:

• The Act repeals and restructures provisions addressing “police-ordered towing” and “nonconsensual towing,” providing separate oversight tracks and systematic rate reviews.
• It expressly defines “exceptional services” and confirms that wrecker services may charge additional fees for exceptional services—including both hourly labor and “the use of equipment to perform such exceptional services”—provided the fees are itemized, reasonable, and necessary.
• The Act increases interim maximum rates pending the first scheduled triennial review in 2028.

This legislation, while prospective, validates the Supreme Court’s reading of the preexisting regulation as a posting and itemization mandate that coexists with substantive permission to recover equipment-use costs for exceptional services.

Scope and Limits of the Holding

• The Court assumes, without deciding, that deploying a rotator can qualify as an “exceptional service” under § 14-63-36b(4). Whether a particular service is “exceptional,” and whether it was reasonable and necessary in the circumstances, remain factual questions for the hearing officer on remand.
• The holding does not authorize a blank check. Exceptional-services charges:
  • Must be genuinely tied to special equipment or activities “not generally required” for a nonconsensual tow at an accident scene;
  • Must be pre-posted on a conspicuous sign, in a format conforming to § 14-65j-3’s labor-rate signage rules;
  • Must be itemized separately on the invoice; and
  • Remain subject to scrutiny for reasonableness and necessity, with the operator maintaining records justifying them.
• The decision invalidates the agency’s categorical disallowance of “equipment charges.” It does not preordain that any specific charge (e.g., “administrative fees”) is permitted if not grounded in the regulatory scheme.

Complex Concepts Explained

• Nonconsensual towing: Tows initiated by order of law enforcement, traffic authority, or under the private property removal statute (§ 14-145). Owners often have no immediate choice of towing provider.
• Exceptional services: The “use of special equipment such as cutting torches, air compressors and other equipment not generally required for nonconsensual towing…at the scene of an accident.” Think rotators, cranes, specialized recovery gear.
• “Itemized in accordance with the hourly charge for labor posted”: This does not mean “price exceptional services as hourly labor.” It means “post and display an itemized schedule of exceptional-services fees on a sign similar in size, layout, and formatting to the labor-rate sign required by § 14-65j-3, and itemize them on the invoice.”
• Hourly rate vs. exceptional-services fees: The Commissioner sets a uniform hourly rate for nonconsensual tows of certain vehicles; that rate excludes exceptional services. Exceptional services are a separate, additional category of charges, subject to reasonableness, necessity, posting, and itemization.
• Posting requirement: Transparency mechanism requiring pre-disclosure of rates and conditions. It helps deter arbitrary or discriminatory pricing and aids after-the-fact review.
• State Police rotation list: A roster of qualified wrecker operators that troopers call in rotation when the owner/operator does not select a tow. Participation requires significant equipment and training commitments.

Practical Impact and Compliance Guidance

For Wrecker Services

• Exceptional-services fees can include equipment-use charges (e.g., rotators, cranes, compressors), but only when services are actually provided and are reasonable and necessary for the incident.
• Implement compliant signage:
  • Post a “Charges and Conditions” sign conforming to § 14-65j-3 (size, headings, formatting), and within it or in a comparable sign, clearly list an itemized schedule of exceptional-services fees.
  • Ensure the sign is displayed wherever customer work orders are placed and prominently at your facility.
• Invoice practices:
  • Separately itemize each exceptional service used, the time applied (if time-based), the equipment deployed, and the rate.
  • Maintain supporting records (scene assessments, photos, trooper communications, crew logs, safety considerations, traffic management rationale) explaining necessity and reasonableness.
• Do not assume all add-ons are permitted. Charges not grounded in the regulations (e.g., generic “administrative fees”) remain suspect unless authorized elsewhere.
• Stay current with Public Act 25-55. From October 1, 2025, the statutory framework expressly allows itemized equipment charges for exceptional services, and the Commissioner will separately evaluate “police-ordered” and “nonconsensual” towing rates.

For Insurers and Vehicle Owners

• Equipment-based exceptional-services fees are not per se unlawful. Challenges should focus on:
  • Was the service truly “exceptional,” and was it necessary and reasonable under the circumstances?
  • Was the fee posted on a conforming sign and itemized on the invoice?
  • Are the rates consistent with the posted schedule? Were non-permitted fees (e.g., administrative surcharges) included?
• Request documentation supporting necessity (e.g., traffic safety concerns, need to prevent additional lane closures, OSHA compliance, scene conditions).

For Hearing Officers and Regulators

• Do not categorically disallow equipment charges as “impermissible.” Analyze:
  • Whether the charge fits within “exceptional services” and was reasonably necessary;
  • Whether the fee was posted in conformity with § 14-65j-3 and itemized on the invoice;
  • Whether the amount is reasonable in light of market conditions, the operator’s posted schedule, and the specific incident.
• Continue to disallow charges that are neither part of the uniform hourly rate nor within the authorized exceptional-services category, unless otherwise authorized by law.
• In light of P.A. 25-55, prepare to apply the updated statutory definitions and separate oversight tracks for “police-ordered” and “nonconsensual” towing prospectively.

Conclusion

Modzelewski’s reorients Connecticut’s towing law around transparency and functional coherence. By construing § 14-63-36c(c)’s “itemized in accordance” language as a posting requirement, not a labor-only cap, the Court permits towing companies to recover the actual costs of exceptional services—including use of high-cost, specialized equipment—when those services are reasonable and necessary. At the same time, the decision preserves robust consumer protection: pre-posting, itemization, recordkeeping, and agency review for reasonableness are mandatory. The ruling harmonizes the nonconsensual towing regime with the State Police rotation system and is reinforced by the 2025 legislative reforms in Public Act 25-55.

Key takeaways:

• Exceptional-services fees may include equipment charges; the regulation’s cross-reference to labor-rate posting is about how to post and itemize, not how to price.
• The uniform hourly rate does not absorb exceptional-services costs; indeed, it explicitly excludes them.
• Transparency is paramount: post, itemize, justify, and maintain records; the Commissioner may require proof and disallow unreasonable or unnecessary charges.
• The decision ensures the continued viability of heavy-duty recovery capabilities on Connecticut highways while safeguarding consumers through clear, enforceable disclosure and oversight rules.